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 After over 100 years of foreign occupation by three different powers, a common 
Polish national identity was able to emerge and unite the three partitioned areas. How 
was this possible? What conditions existed that were able to bring together three separate 
and distinct areas together? This thesis will look into the development of Polish national 
identity in the three partitioned areas of Poland during the late 19
Introduction 
th and early 20th
The purpose of this thesis is to carry out a comparative study of the three 
partitioned areas of Poland between roughly 1863 and the outbreak of World War I. 
Specifically, the thesis compares the effects of the three Imperial powers on the economic 
landscape of each region, as well as the environment in which Polish political thought, 
specifically different forms of Polish nationalism, emerged, analyzing how that 
environment help contribute to its development. 
 
centuries and in particular the role that imperial policy played in its formation. 
This study will look at the attitude and policies of the ruling powers towards the 
Poles and other ethnic groups in order to gain a better understanding of the impact these 
policies had on the lives of the Poles. Also under examination are the ethnic and national 
composition of the partitioned areas and the economic and political status of the Polish 
population. One question that repeatedly appears is how policy and attitude on the local 
level differed or mirrored those put forth by the imperial governments. Finally, this thesis 
will examine the prominent political philosophies present within Poland after 1863 and, 
specifically, the development of Roman Dmowski’s political ideology and Józef 
Piłsudski’s Polish Socialist Party. 
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The study is divided into four main sections. The first section is a general 
background that includes the history of the “January Uprising.” The goal of this section is 
to introduce the reader to the relevant period and give the reader a better understanding of 
the Polish situation and Polish question. Section Two focuses on the demographic 
composition of the three partitioned areas, including the size of the Polish population 
within each region, the size of the “dominant” imperial population, and the size of any 
other relevant minority populations. This section also looks at the economic position of 
the Polish population within each partitioned area. Section Three breaks down the 
imperial policies of each region and the effect they had on their respective regions. Here, 
the economic developments and attitudes and policies of the local governments also play 
a role. Finally, Section Four details the development of Polish Positivism and explains 
how this philosophy and related policies set the stage for the new types of Polish 
nationalism that soon reemerged. This last section ends with an account of the ideologies 
of Roman Dmowski and Józef Piłsudski, two prominent figures in the late imperial 
period who would come to define the political landscape of Independent Poland after the 
First World War. 
 My study of Poland and its partitions began with works of Norman Davies, and 
more specifically his work God’s Playground, a semi-historical, semi-narrative account 
of Poland from the beginning of the Polonian dynasty to the present. Davies’ book takes a 
rather conventional approach to the study of Polish history, but God’s Playground and his 
other works are among the most well known of modern Polish historical studies in 
English, and play an important role in the scholarship.1
                                                        
1 New York: Columbia University Press, 1982. 
 Many have departed from Davies, 
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specifically when it comes to examining and analyzing the partitioned areas of Poland. 
Some of the more prominent and more recent scholarship in the area includes the work of 
Brian A. Porter, Richard Blanke, Theodore Weeks, Alison Frank, and Keely Stauter-
Halsted, which all make at least a brief appearance within the thesis. Porter’s work 
focuses on the intellectual developments within the Russian Partition. His article “The 
Social Nation and Its Futures: English Liberalism and Polish Nationalism in Late 
Nineteenth-Century Warsaw,” for example, examines the shift by Warsaw intellectuals 
away from Romanticism after the 1863 January Uprising to a uniquely Polish style of 
Positivism.2 The article also examines the foundation of Polish Positivism and questions 
the claim that such Positivists had truly given up on independence. Blanke’s works 
primarily focus on the German partition and the development or lack of development of a 
Polish national identity. His book Prussian Poland in the German Empire (1871-1900) 
examines the political policies of Otto Von Bismarck and the role they played with the 
Polish population of eastern Germany.3 Blanke makes the argument that Bismarck’s 
policies, which he believes were aimed directly at containing the Polish population, had 
the opposite result and helped strengthen the Polish national element. Weeks’ work, 
Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western 
Frontier, 1863-1914, is less focused on the Polish partition and deals more with Russian 
attitude and policy towards all of its western territories.4
                                                        
2 American Historical Review, 101, no. 5 (1996). 
 Weeks argues that the Tsarist 
government did not actively partake in policies of Russification, while analyzing the 
political parties that began to emerge within the Duma and their stances towards the Poles. 
3 New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. 
4 DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996. 
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 While the works of Frank and Stauter-Halsted are not directly related to the focus 
of this thesis, they provide interesting and useful perspectives on the topic. Frank’s Oil 
Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia takes an in-depth look at the oil 
industry within Austria Galicia, the reasons for its collapse and the effect it had, or lack 
thereof, on the industrial state of Galicia.5 Stauter-Halsted’s book, The Nation in the 
Village: The Genesis of Peasant National Identity in Austrian Poland, 1848-1914, 
focuses on the development of Polish peasant identity within Austrian Poland, including 
the role of the ruling class, the Polish nobility, and the Imperial Austrian government in 
the construction of the Peasant Pole.6
 Turning to theories of nationalism, there are a few major theorists, representing 
different fields and approaches that influenced or had an impact on this thesis. The first 
two are Ernest Gellner and Rogers Brubaker. In Nations and Nationalism, Gellner 
attempts to define and study the phenomenon known as nationalism, and develops a 
working model of what he believes are the prerequisites for the development and 
emergence of nationalism and the effects it has on societies.
 She also details the birth of and establishment of a 
politically conscious peasant class. 
7
                                                        
5 Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005. 
 One of Gellner’s strongest 
beliefs is that nationalism can only develop within an industrial society and that mobility 
is a key factor in the development of nationalism. In Gellner’s own words, “The social 
organization of agrarian society, however, is not at all favorable to the nationalist 
principle, to the convergence of political and cultural units and to the homogeneity and 
6 Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001. 
7 Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher, 1983. 
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school-transmitted nature of culture within each political unit.”8 This sentiment, however, 
is not consistent with the Polish situation. As will be discussed in later sections, Polish 
nationalism developed in a region that was primarily agrarian and lacked large industrial 
centers. Gellner also claims that nationalism is the expression of a singular high culture 
of a certain people. Gellner believes that for nationalism to develop within a society “it 
must be one in which they can all breath and speak and produce; so it must be the same 
culture… and it can no longer be a diversified, locality-tied, illiterate little culture and 
tradition.”9
 The work of Rogers Brubaker offers an interesting and relevant challenge.  
Brubaker is a sociologist, thus his focus and reasoning differ from that of Gellner with his 
historical background. Brubaker takes a more personalized stance and argues that the 
study of nationalism needs to be viewed from an individual standpoint and that we need 
to understand that ethnic groups and nations are not real entities but social fabrications. 
Brubaker also claims that we need to be wary of much stock we place in the role of 
histories and ethnic rivalry in the formation of national identities.
 This claim is more relevant within the study, as seen by the importance of the 
Polish language and culture in the development of the Polish national movements. 
 10
Finally, in The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, 
Partha Chatterjee offers a strong parallel to the Polish case and the methodology used 
 This view is relevant 
in the Polish case when considering the ethnically centered nationalist views of Roman 
Dmowski and his national democrats. 
                                                        
8 Gellner, 39. 
9 Gellner, 38. 
10 Rogers Brubaker, “Myths and Misconceptions,” in The State of the Nation: Ernest 
Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism, ed. John A. Hall (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 289-291.  
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within this thesis.11
In the context of these different approaches to nationalism, the overall goal of this 
thesis is to gain a better understanding of the development of Polish nationalism within 
the three partitioned areas, and specifically, how a semi-coherent and semi-unified sense 
of national identity was able to develop across three different empires. 
 Here Chatterjee focuses on the period prior to the “official awakening” 
of Indian nationalism in the 1880s and instead focuses on the period in which Indian 
nationalism was beginning to develop within the upper tiers of society. Chatterjee is 
interested in the development of nationalist thought within the middle class (a group 
similar to the Polish intelligentsia) and specifically looks at how ideology and identity 
were developed through culture and literature. The main focus of Chatterjee’s work is 
how the Indian middle class was able to develop its own distinct form of nationalism that 
was different then the dominant structure around it, in this case that of the Colonial 
English government. This situation is paralleled within the following study, in the fact 
that the Polish middle and upper classes were able to develop their own form of 
nationalism, despite the presence of three distinct imperial governments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
11 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. 
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Section One: Background 
 By 1863, the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had been fully absorbed 
by the Hapsburg, Russian, and Prussian empires and had been under each empire’s sway 
for over 60 years. Each empire had taken a different approach to how it incorporated its 
apportioned areas. The Russian empire had divided the territory it acquired during the 
partitions into two distinct areas: the first area consisted of the territories in the West; the 
second area was that of the Polish lands. Over the course of the 19th century, the borders 
of these two territories would shift, but by 1863 the Congress Kingdom12 and the 
Western Provinces would emerge.  (See Figure 1, map of Russian Poland) The Congress 
Kingdom was governed by emissaries of the Russian Empire but was not considered to 
be on the same political level as the Western Provinces or Russia proper. In 1864 the 
Congress Kingdom was officially incorporated into the Russian Empire and was renamed 
the Vistulaland. The Western Provinces were handled in a different manner after the 
partition. The Russian government viewed these areas as belonging to Greater Russia, 
thus they officially incorporated the land into the empire. Lithuanian, Belorussian and 
Ukrainian nationalism had yet to emerge and Russians, including the imperial 
government, believed that these people were Russian but had been under the influence of 
Poles.13
 
  
 
 
                                                        
12 Davies, 81. 
13 Weeks, 8. 
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Figure 1, Map of Russian Poland.14
      
The Austrian partitions of Poland became the territory of Galicia, which by 1867 
was an autonomous region within the Hapsburg Empire.15                                                        
14 Davies 83, map 2. 
  As the power of the Hapsburg 
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monarchy started to fade, so did its control over Galicia. (See Figure 2, map of Austrian 
Poland) Finally, the areas portioned by the Prussian empire would simply merge with 
Prussia. (See Figure 3, map of Prussian Poland) By 1863 there seems to have been very 
little friction between the ethnic Polish population and the Prussian governments 
advances.16 Polish nationalism was noticeably absent and the Poles that remained were 
content to be a part of the Prussian Empire. It would not be until Bismarck’s rise and the 
unification of Germany that friction would come about.17
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2, Map of Austrian Poland.18
                                                                                                                                                                     
15 Davies, 151. 
 
16 Davies, 114-116. 
17 Blanke, 7-10, 
18 Davies, 140, map 4. 
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Figure 3, Map of Prussian Poland.19
                                                        
19 Davies, 113, map 3. 
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The year 1863 marks an important year for the development of Polish nationalism 
and an independent Polish nationalism. This is due to the fact that in January 1863, Poles 
within the Russian partitions launched a revolt. This was not the first time Poles had 
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taken up arms against the ruling imperial powers. In 1830-31 the Poles attempted a 
revolution and, for the sake of brevity here, failed.20 The “January Uprising,” as the 1863 
revolt would later become known, had its origins in the romantic ideals of upper classes 
of the Poles and the repressive and backwards actions of the Russian government. The 
January Uprising has its direct origins in the actions of Weilpolski and his forced 
conscription of 10,000 men. This, however, was merely the spark that lit the powder keg. 
After forced conscription was enacted, the Poles then waged a guerrilla war against the 
Russian empire and eventually established a separate government. The January Uprising 
was short lived and ended with the capture of Traugutt, the acting leader of the newly 
formed Polish government and leader of the revolution, in 1864.21 In the end the 
revolution failed in part because the Polish upper class failed to convince enough of the 
peasantry to join the fight. As E. Garrison Walters observes, “… peasant support was 
sufficiently strong to keep the insurrection going, but not powerful enough to make the 
countryside untenable for the Russians.”22
                                                        
20 For more information about the 1830-1831 Revolution see R. F. Leslie’s Polish 
Politics and the Revolution of November 1830 (London: University of London, Athlone 
Press, 1956). 
 It is important to note that the January 
Uprising had a minimal affect upon the other partitioned areas. As mentioned earlier, 
there was little political activity within Prussian area, thus the Uprising was meet by deaf 
ears. One might expect that the Uprising would meet more success within more liberal 
Galicia; however, this was not the case.  The Austrian-Poles were content with the status 
21 Davies, 354-360. 
22 E Garrison Walters, The Other Europe: Eastern Europe to 1945 (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1988), 53. 
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quo and were equally subdued from their own earlier efforts of revolution in 1830. The 
Austrian Poles had nothing to gain from joining in the Uprising and everything to lose.23
 The aftermath of the January Uprising affected all of the partitioned areas of 
Poland but had the largest impact on Russian Poland and Austrian Poland. As one would 
expect, the Russian response to revolt within their empire was not well received. Any 
sense or hope of autonomy was stripped away. This is when the Congress Kingdom was 
abolished and the area was formally incorporated into the Russian Empire as the 
Vistulaland. The name change was a deliberate attempt to completely erase any lingering 
sense of Polishness from the landscape. During this period some of the most anti-Polish 
policies were put into place. The actions of the Russian imperial and local governments 
will be viewed more in-depth in Section Three.
  
24 The effect upon Galicia was of a 
different mold. Due to the harsh conditions and fear of repercussions,25 many political 
elites that had operated in Russian Poland fled. Some fled to other parts of Europe but 
most fled to the more liberal Galicia. Upon arriving in Galicia many of these more radical 
elites were unhappy with the political environment there, mainly the passive and 
submissive nature of the Polish nobility and the backwardness of the region. Even though 
the actual January Uprising had not brought reform or change to Galicia, the aftermath 
would eventually take the form of new political elites who set up shop within its 
borders.26
                                                        
23 Walters, 88. 
 
24 Weeks, 97. 
25 A fear that was very real due to the political atmosphere and nature of retribution post 
January Uprising. 
26 Walters, 89. 
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 The January Uprising had one more effect upon the partitioned areas of the 
former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, it ushered in a new era of political thinking.  
Prior to the 1863, most political thinkers both within Poland and abroad that had 
concerned themselves with the independence of Poland could be classified as Romantic 
thinkers. They were somewhat anti-Western in thought and drew upon the great history 
and culture of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.27 The Poles of this early 19th-
century era were also deeply enamored with the idea of winning back independence 
through armed struggle. Since the failed revolt of the 1830s, Russian-Poles kept this hope 
alive.28 The January Uprising came to embody all romantic ideals, thus its defeat came to 
symbolize that such ideals were also inadequate. In its place a new political philosophy 
would emerge in the form of Positivism with a Polish twist, and the adoption of the 
method of “organic work.” In essence, this philosophy revolved around accepting the 
political situation the Poles were in and using the avenues available to improve their 
standing.29
 
  This transition from Romanticism to Positivism and, eventually, more 
modern concepts of Nationalism will be discussed later in Section Four. Section Four will 
also include a more in-depth look at what exactly Polish-Positivism consisted of. 
 
 
 
                                                        
27 Andrzej Walicki, Poland Between East and West: The Controversies over Self-
Definition and Modernization in Partitioned Poland, (Cambridge: Unkraine Research 
Institute, Harvard University, 1994), 29. 
28 Porter, English, 1473-1475. 
29 Walicki, 28. 
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The partitioned areas of Poland were not politically or economically 
homogeneous. Each region was different from one another for obvious reasons and 
within each region Poles held varying positions. Also present within these regions were 
the main ethnic peoples of the partitioning power, Jewish populations and other ethnic 
minorities such as the emerging Ukrainian population and later the groups that would 
come to identify themselves as Lithuanians, Belarusians and others.  
Section Two: Composition 
 
Galicia 
Within the former partitioned areas, Poles tended to dominate the landscape. 
Within Galicia, people who spoke Polish numbered 2,789,748 or a little over 54% of the 
Galician population in 1890.30 Along with their slight ethnic domination, Poles within 
Galicia were relativity well off. 51.9% of the Polish speaking population could read and 
write compared to only 38.9% who were illiterate.31
                                                        
30 S.D. Corrsin, 1998. “Literacy rates and questions of language, faith and ethnic identity 
in population censuses in the partitioned Polish lands and Interwar Poland, 1880s-1930s.” 
Polish Review 43, no. 2,152-153, table II. Data for the Galician region was taken from the 
1890 Galician Census.  
 The Polish population within Galicia 
consisted of mainly landed nobility and gentry. This high position eventually afforded the 
Poles great political strength and standing within the Hapsburg Empire. Eventually the 
Poles would become one of the three favored (recognized) ethnic groups within the 
empire, along with the Hungarians and Austrians. Economically, the Polish-speaking 
population was strong, or at least relative to Galicia: Polish speakers owned a majority of 
the land and without a large industrial base, agriculture was dominant within the 
31 Corrsin, 154, table II.  
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territory.32 This would hold true until the oil boom of the 1880s; however, even this 
development would not alter the dominance of Polish population within the economic 
sphere.33
The major ethnic rival to the Polish-speaking population within Galicia was the 
Ukrainian-speaking population. While Ukrainians made up a total of 2,147,336 people or 
roughly 42% of the population, 76.8% of them were illiterate.
 
34 Furthermore, most of 
these peoples were peasants and under the rule or control of the wealthier, land-owning 
Poles. Even with such large numbers, due to the above factors, and the fact that a 
Ukrainian national identity was slow to emerge, the Ukrainian population was not too 
relevant in terms of the development of Polish nationalism.35
Finally, the German-speaking population of Galicia was very small. It consisted 
of only 152,713 people or roughly 3% of the population, though interestingly enough, 
only 35.1% of the German-speaking population was illiterate.
 
36
 
 Despite the fact that they 
represented the imperil culture, German speakers played a very limited role in the lives of 
the Poles and Ukrainians. After over 100 years of ruling over Galicia, the Hapsburgs had 
barely made an impression upon the majority of the Polish population. 
 
 
                                                         
32 Walters, 88. 
33 Alison Frank, “Environmental, Economic, and Moral Dimensions of Sustainability in 
the Petroleum Industry in Austrian Galicia” Modern Intellectual History 8,1 (2011), 171. 
34 Corrsin, 153, table V. 
35 Walters, 88-89. 
36 Corrsin, 153, table V. 
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Congress Poland 
 Within Congress Poland in 1897 the Polish-speaking population numbered 
4,815,099, or a little over 71% of the population.37 Given that the bulk of Poles in all 
three partitions were within this area, their place in the political and economic spectrum 
varied greatly. In general Poles were worse off than they were in Galicia and generally 
occupied lower ranks: 61.4% of the Polish-speaking population, for example, was 
illiterate.38 Politically the Poles were in a rough spot, especially after 1863; while 
recognized by the Russian Empire, the Poles were generally discriminated against. The 
Congress Kingdom lacked many of the even minor representative tools of the Russian 
Empire, such as the rural councils and zemstovs, and was one of the most heavily 
administrated areas of the Empire. The high level of bureaucracy and administration lead 
to the exclusion of Poles from political life.39 Economically the Polish population was no 
better off. Even though Warsaw and Łódź were some of the most industrialized areas of 
the Russian Empire, the majority of the population “lived on and from the land.”40
For a better understanding of the entire political and economic landscape of the 
Congress Kingdom, one must take into account the position of the Jewish population, 
which numbered 1,321,100 or 15%-20% of the total population.
 
41
                                                        
37 Corrsin, 155, table V. Data for the Congress Kingdom was taken from the Russian 
Census of 1897.  
The most important 
characteristic of the Jewish population is that they dominated the urban areas within the 
Congress Kingdom. Within each province, the Jewish population never made up more 
38 Corrsin, 155, table V. 
39 Weeks, 80-83. 
40 Weeks, 81. 
41 Corrsin, 155, table V. The Jewish population figures include all people, whereas total 
population figures only include those that are over 9 years or unknown age. 
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than 5% of the rural community--instead Jews dominated cities and small towns and 
settlements. Within some provinces, such as Łomża, Radom, and Siedlce, Jews made up 
over 55% of the peoples within cities. Politically, Jews were generally excluded from 
participating in the political process and were discriminated against; however, the 
Congress Kingdom was more lenient towards its Jewish population and afforded them 
greater opportunities than within Russia proper. With the Jewish statue of 1882, the 
Jewish population was almost on equal terms with the other peoples of the Empire.42 The 
boundaries of the Pale of Settlement also played a large role in the distribution and 
eventual residing places of the Jewish populations.43
The Russian population within the Congress Kingdom was very small, and often 
times limited to a few provinces. In five out of the ten Congress Kingdom provinces, 
there was no Russian nationality present, or numerous enough to take into account. In 
only two of the provinces do the percentage of the population even break 4%.
 
44 Also if 
one were to look at the total number of Eastern Orthodox peoples within the Congress 
Kingdom,45 one can see that they number only 607,121 or less than 8% of the total 
population.46 Politically, as mentioned earlier, the Russian population dominated through 
its use of the bureaucracy, influence from the center of Moscow, and the prejudice 
towards the Poles that excluded them from becoming involved.47
                                                        
42 Weeks, 101. 
 
43 For more information on the Pale of Settlement see Benjamin Nathans’ Beyond the 
Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002). 
44 Weeks, 83, table 2. 
45 Not an inherent indicator of Russianness but one used by Russians to identify 
themselves (Weeks). 
46 Corrsin, 155, table V. 
47 Weeks, 103. 
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  Within the “Western Provinces” of Wilno, Grodno and Wołyń,48 the Polish 
speaking population numbered 353,308 or roughly 8% of the population.49 This trend 
continues in the other provinces.50 The positioning of the Polish population within these 
provinces is a bit different then that of the Congress Kingdom. Poles were still low on the 
political spectrum, yet the Polish minority dominated the ownership of land within the 
region, due to the legacy of the medieval Polish-Lithuanian Jagiellonian dynasty in this 
area.  In 7 out of the 9 Western Provinces small Polish populations of no more the 9% 
held over 40.6% of privately held land, and within Kovno, Wilna and Grodno Poles held 
over 50% f the land.51
The Russian population within the Western Provinces was much stronger and 
much more apparent: in 8 of 9 of the Western Provinces Russians made up over 60% of 
the population, while in 4 of the 9 provinces, Russians made up over 80% of the 
population.
 While the Poles may not have dominated in numbers of people or 
political power, they clearly commanded the rural landscape in an area that was 
predominantly agrarian. 
52 Even though the Russian nationality was strongly represented within the 
region, it does not mean that they were a dominant economic force. As mentioned earlier, 
Poles held most of the privately held land, but the closer one got to the Russian border, 
the more control the Russian population started to exert over property.53
                                                        
48 Current-day Lithuania and Belarus. 
 An interesting 
side note is the presence of large Lithuanian populations within certain provinces, mainly 
49 Corrsin, 156, table V. 
50 Weeks, 86, table 5. 
51 Weeks, 86-87, table 5 and table 6. 
52 Weeks, 86, table 5. 
53 Weeks, 87, table 6. 
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that Kovno and to a much lesser extents Vilna and Vitebsk.54
 
 Finally, the Jewish 
population within the Western Provinces was 881,123 or 20% of the total population. Of 
those, 629,039 resided within Vilno, Grodno, and Wołyn. This large concentration was 
most likely due to the internal policies governing where Jews were allowed to live within 
the Pale of Settlement. 
Prussian Poland 
Statistics concerning ethnic division within Prussian Poland are difficult to come 
by. The first obstacle is the relative lack of study on the area and the second obstacle is 
that the numbers that do exist, within the 1885 census, are not wholly accurate due to the 
Prussian influence upon the numbers: the Prussians were very lenient in who they 
considered to be Germans, thus the numbers do not accurately reflect the true 
composition within the region.55 These numbers are obtained from the 1890 German 
Census, which are presented in Blanke’s Prussian Poland in the German Empire (1871-
1900), and do not account for individual nationality beyond German. In Pozan (Poznań) 
Germans numbered only 34%, in Bomberg (Bydgoszcz) 50%, in Marienwerder 
(Bydgoszcz) 61%, and in Danzig (Gdańsk) they numbered 72% of the total population. It 
is clear that the even in the areas where the Germans were the minority, they still had to 
co-exist with a very prevalent ethnic population, most likely Polish.56
                                                        
54 Weeks, 86, table 5. 
 Another interesting 
aspect to look at is the percentage of land owned, as reported by Gossler in 1885 in a 
presentation to the German cabinet. Poles owned 51% of the land within Pozan, 42% of 
55 Blanke, 41. 
56 Blanke, 41-42. 
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the land in Bromberg, 13% in Marienwerder, and 9% in Danzig. These numbers show 
that the Polish “minority” had a strong presence within Poznań and Bromberg and were 
still a minor force within Marienwerder and Danzig.57
 
 The most important fact to take 
away from these demographic figures is that the Polish population was still considerable 
within the Prussian Polish lands, so much so that in some areas it was even dominant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
57 Blanke, 61-63. 
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Section Three: Imperial Histories 
 
Russian Empire: 
 Russian imperial policy concerning the Congress Kingdom was a policy as 
confused and convoluted as the Russian Empire itself. At no one time did the Russian 
Empire engage in a purely nationalistic policy aimed against Poles. Yet most of the 
actions of the Russian Empire were aimed at keeping the Poles in check. Imperial Russia 
was not concerned with the promotion of Russian nationalism but rather with maintaining 
the strength and unity of the Empire and position of the imperial bureaucracy. Due to this 
agenda and the perception that Poles, as well as Jews, were an inherent enemy, Russia 
and more specially those in charge of the Congress Kingdom, enacted many anti-Polish 
policies to stem the tide of modernization within the Congress Kingdom.58
 For most of its existence the Congress Kingdom was a province of the Russian 
Empire. As detailed in the previous Section, it was not until the January Uprising of 1863 
that the Russian government saw fit to officially incorporate the area into the Empire, or 
saw no choice but to do so.
 
59 However, even though the Congress Kingdom was 
officially a part of the Empire, it did not share the bureaucratic advantages of the rest of 
the Empire. None of the small democratic changes instituted within the Empire  by 
Alexander II made it to the Congress Kingdom, or when they finally did, it was too little, 
too late.60
                                                        
58 Weeks, 33-35. 
 The Russian government and even the delegates within the Duma feared that if 
they gave any kind of power to the Poles, the Poles would use it to either weaken the 
59 Davies, 96-97. 
60 Weeks, 101. 
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Russian position or weaken the Russian elements in their society. This fear of weakening 
the Russian element practically explains why the policies of the zemstovs were only 
reluctantly introduced into the Western Provinces and never in the Congress Kingdom.61
Another interesting feature of Russian imperial policy was its emphasis on trying 
to win over the peasantry. Tsar Alexander II and the imperial government saw potential 
in the Polish-speaking peasants and believed that they could use these non-nationalized 
people to their advantage. Along with an inherent distrust of the upper parts of Polish 
society, this devotion to the peasantry led to a policy that was aimed at the rural parts of 
society.
 
62 While the peasantry benefited from these policies, they never truly persuaded 
or won the peasantry over. After the 1863 revolution, 700,000 Polish peasants were given 
land and became freehold landowners. This was an obvious attempt by Imperial Russia to 
try and win over the peasantry, yet this effort, like so many others failed.63
 In some cases, it may be more important to look at what the Russian government 
did not do than what it did do. For most of their existence, the Congress Kingdom and the 
Western Provinces were heavily regulated regions of the Russian Empire. Yet with all of 
this bureaucracy, the regions were never really improved upon. This stems from a 
multitude of factors. The first is the fact that the Russian government inherently 
distrusted the Polish middle and upper classes. This distrust, as discussed briefly earlier, 
was due to the fact that the Russian government believed that Poles were an inherent 
enemy of the empire. Another aspect that played into this distrust was the very Catholic 
nature of the Poles and the Eastern Orthodox nature of the Russians. While the Russian 
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government was not a nationalistic government or concerned itself, in general, with 
causes of nationalism, it did identify itself as an Eastern Orthodox nation and a defender 
of the Eastern Orthodox religion. It generally categorized or identified Russians based 
primarily on the basis of being of the Eastern Orthodox faith. The Russian government 
saw the Catholic Church as an enemy and saw the Poles as the agent of this enemy.64
 The tide started to shift after the 1863 revolution. The Russian government 
wanted peace and order restored to the region and was determined to have it. After the 
rebellion, the Russian Empire was determined to reform the Congress Kingdom and 
weaken the Polish element within it.  The re-naming of the Congress Kingdom as the 
“Vistula land” is important here for it is one of the first acts of anti-Polish policy. Under 
the reign of Tsar Alexander the II, the Russian government , pursued a policy of peasant 
reforms, which included the emancipation of the serfs with the Emancipation Decree, the 
freeing of the State peasants, and the emergence of rural councils, law courts and 
schools.
 
65 It was the belief of the Russian government that it could, as noted earlier, win 
over the peasants and destroy the economic base of the nobility within the Polish 
provinces.66 A reform of the local government was also an attempt to give greater powers 
to the rural communes.67
 With this very laissez-faire style of rule, most of the governing of the Congress 
Kingdom was left to the local governance. These governors and generals of the Congress 
Kingdom would oftentimes follow their own desires and were generally allowed to do so. 
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Things in the Western Provinces were much worse for the Polish element during this time. 
The Empire had placed Count M.N. Muraviev in charge in order to take care of the 
insurrection. Muraviev, who would eventually become known by the Poles as Muraviev 
the Hangman, enacted a brutal policy that aimed to crush the Polish uprising and 
strengthening the local Russian element.68 In 1865 a step was taken by the Russian 
government to weaken the Poles economically: the Decree of December 1865, which 
kept anyone of “Polish descent” from purchasing land within the Western Provinces. In 
conjunction with this decree, large parcels of land that had been owned by 
insurrectionists were taken by the government and sold.69
 Meanwhile, in the newly renamaed and incorporated Vistulaland, the decades 
following the January Uprising were marked by little political development and 
educational reform. In 1869 the academic freedom of the University of Warsaw was 
suppressed and the russification of the educational system began.
 
70  The bulk of the 
education reform would occur under the governorship of I.V. Gurko, the governor 
general of Warsaw from 1883 to 1894, and A. Apukhtin, head of the Wars educational 
district.71 Even the Polish Szkola Głowna was transformed into a Russian University. 
After these reforms, many Poles were forced to use underground schools. As a result of 
this educational reform, by the turn of the century, almost 2/3 of the population was 
illiterate.72
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themselves.  While the two local governors did not enact any new policy or new laws, 
they merely took advantage of the environment created in the aftermath of the Uprising 
and the new regime of Tsar Alexander III. Alexander III ushered in a new era, vastly 
different then Alexander II’s more reformed-minded reign: he wanted to strengthen his 
position and weaken any outside political entities. The main objective of Alexander III’s 
reign was the pursuit of political control and the solidification of the position of the 
Russian element within the Empire.73 It is important to note that while Alexander III’s 
reign brought pressure against local nationalities and political independence, Gurko and 
Apukhtin did not act on any specific policy implemented by the Tsar. Instead, the two 
men were simply carrying out their own policies. According to Weeks, “the anti-Polish 
actions of these two men should not blind us to the fact that no new policy was 
inaugurated during these years.”74 The repressive policies of Gurko and Apukhtin 
eventually led, in addition to other factors, to the revival of militant nationalist sentiments 
within the Congress Kingdom.75
Imperial policy drastically changed after the 1905 revolution.  The imperial 
government finally realized that its previous actions were not having the desired effects 
and were actually working against them.
 This reemergence of nationalist feeling will be discussed 
in Section Four. 
76
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zemstovs was to strengthen and empower the local Russian populations.77 The right to be 
represented in the Duma was also extended to Poles; they were given more political 
freedom, but were still under the dominance of the Russians. Also, in July 1905, the use 
of Polish within states schools was granted, yet it was a small concession due to the fact 
Polish could only be used to teach Polish literature and Catholic religion.78
 All of these Russian policies ultimately had the effect of helping to solidify and 
give birth to new Polish nationalist movements. After the Uprising, many of the Polish 
political thinkers began to move on from the Romantic idealism of independence through 
revolution. In its placed they began to adopt an attitude of working within the framework 
of the system to improve the Polish position. This shift, which is broadly known as Polish 
Positivism, will be discussed at greater length in Section Four. This active participation 
within the framework of the Russian government would be relativity short, due to the 
lack of improvement on the part of the Russian government. As explained above, Russian 
imperial policy rarely ever focused on improving the condition of the Polish people, 
especially those within the middle and upper classes. The Russian fear of such groups 
helped to keep stagnation and backwardness the norm. The only real reforms enacted 
were limited rural reforms and even these were never done on a large enough scale to 
truly alter the situation within the province. Finally, these lack of reforms and progress 
kept Poland from industrializing. Without large-scale industry, Poland’s population 
would remain primarily agrarian and this result in most of its people remaining peasants 
or tied to the peasantry. 
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Austria/Galicia/Hapsburg Empire 
Of the three Polish partitions, the Galician province was by far the most tolerant 
and even accepting of its Polish population. The Polish nobility, who had come to terms 
with the rule of the Hapsburg Empire by 1831, did all they could in order to convince the 
Imperial government of their loyalty. This was done for two reasons: the first was to keep 
political control of the territory in which they had influence; and secondly, to keep 
control over the lands that they ruled.79 By 1867 this policy of appeasement and loyalty 
had paid off for the Poles. With the Ausgleich of 1867 the Poles were recognized as a 
favored minority, a recognition that granted them privileges unheard of within the other 
partitioned areas.80 These privileges basically amounted to almost total political control 
over the province and a semi-autonomous nature. This laissez-faire approach by the 
Hapsburgs allowed for Galicia to be administered solely by Poles, who had maintained 
their political and social status from the pre-partition era. It also meant that the Imperial 
government had very little sway within the province and that the Imperial government 
did very little within the province. The practical result of the privileges granted by Franz 
Joseph I was “that Galicia enjoyed almost complete autonomy.”81
The real source of policy, as mentioned above, was that of the local Galician 
government. By 1883 the Diet of Galicia had power over agriculture, forestry, public 
health, and education; even the Imperial post designated as a representative of the 
Emperor was usually a Pole.
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communities tended to rely upon older and already established structures. According to 
Hugh Seton-Watson, “…rural communities devised methods for regulating their own 
affairs, many of which continued to function even after formal governmental bodies and 
official organizations came to the countryside.”83
Beyond the political ramifications of these policies, another important aspect was 
their economic impact: by 1887, 81% of the Galician province consisted of peoples still 
considered peasants. The nobility had effectively shut the door on economic development, 
thus preserving their own hold on power. This also meant that they had put a halt to 
modernization.
 This self-reliance would eventually 
prove disadvantageous to the rural communities due to the fact that it would keep them 
isolated from the larger picture and allowed political elites to keep power. 
84 Even where Galicia was ripe for modernization, such as the areas that 
contained rich oil fields, it was kept from properly developing. The economic policy 
within these areas was poor and short sighted.85 Those in charge of the oil fields did 
everything in their power to produce as much oil as possible in as short as time as 
possible. No long-term plan was ever constructed and the only motivation was profit.86 
The local elite supported these policies because it only strengthened their position. They 
were able to put up a guise of modernizing, without truly changing the landscape in 
which they functioned. Austrian mineral rights were based off the “rule of capture” and 
the Austrian government was loath to challenge this precedent.87
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was a purely political decision that had nothing to do with either the technological 
demands of petroleum extraction or the economic structures most favorable to the 
production of inexpensive fuel. On the contrary, it was a strategy designed to 
encourage Galicia’s landowning political elite to support the imperial government 
in Vienna. For those landowners, the primacy of private property ownership (not 
nationalism) was the first principle of politics.88
 
 
Another important aspect of these policies was that it stalled the development of 
internal nationalist movements. The majority of Austrian Poles had no desire for 
independence due to the fact that they were satisfied with the current status quo.89 
Furthermore, without a large middle class, no separate internal political movements could 
come to exist. Internal nationalist movements faced this same challenge, along with the 
fact that a large percentage of the population was not Polish but Ukrainian.90
 While the Galician region might not have been as replete with Imperial activity as 
the other two regions, it is just as important. The hands-off nature of the Hapsburg 
Empire provided a the perfect crucible for the development of Polish national and 
political movements, though these movements had their spiritual and intellectual origins 
outside of the region. The freedom granted by the Imperial government to the Poles was 
invaluable. It provided a safe haven for political elites from the other partitioned areas, 
 While the 
atmosphere within Galicia did not promote the development of indigenous political 
movements, it did provide a safe haven for political exiles from the other partitioned 
areas, due to the high standing and relative freedom of the Poles in this region. This open 
environment would eventually lead to the development of political movements that had 
external origins—to be discussed later especially when we look at Roman Dmowski and 
the development of his nationalist party in Section Four. 
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which would eventually lead to the strengthening of Polish nationalist causes and the 
development of nationalist and more modern political movements within Galicia. Two of 
the more prominent pre-war political organizations, the National Democrats and the 
Socialists, both had their base of operations within Galicia.91
 
 This proximity to the other 
partitioned areas and their close proximity to Polish populations gave them an advantage 
when attempting to establish legitimacy. This, along with the development of these two 
parties and their respective leaders will be discussed in more detail in the following 
Section. In the end, the Austrian policy of appeasement might have been the most 
effective at deterring the establishment of the radical revolutionary nationalist movements 
seen in Russia, but it would not fully deter the development of nationalist movements. 
Instead it would create a fertile environment in which political thought could grow and 
eventually flourish.  
Prussian-German Background 
 The area partitioned by the Prussian Empire was much different then that of its 
two counterparts. Prussian-Poland, which would eventually become a part of the newly 
formed Germany, was distinctly less autonomous then the Austrian or Russian partitioned 
areas. This area, according to Walters, is seen as the least dynamic of the three partitioned 
areas and as a place where there was very little political intrigue, due to the fierce 
nationalization programs to be described below.92
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 Prior to the unification of Germany, Prussian policy within the partitioned areas 
was very hostile towards Poles. The Prussian objective was to put down any hope of 
resistance or thought of revolution. After the 1830 revolution in Russian Poland the 
Prussian government succeeded in this policy. Any sense of Polish national sentiment 
was generally diffused and the Polish population continued to exist within the framework 
of the Empire. Political life for Poles was very limited within the Prussian Empire and 
was at times non-existent due to the fact that the Prussian government had taken 
measures to weaken the existing nobility and replace it with that of the Junkers. This 
strengthened the Prussian position within the partitioned lands and undermined the only 
real opposition to Prussian Power.93 By the time of the 1863 revolution, not much of a 
Polish national sentiment existed within Prussian borders. Walters claims that most 
Polish nationalists or anyone with the power to do so left the area due to its harsh 
conditions and unfriendly environment.94 By the 1860s, Prussian attitudes towards the 
Poles had not faded but their actions had. According to Blanke, “True, the official 
position of these representatives remained one of adamant opposition to their situation, 
but their protestations began to take on routine, pro forma, coloration.”95  The Poles 
within Prussia eventually came to accept their situation and began to try and work with 
Prussians.96
 Things would drastically change under the rule of Bismarck, who came to power 
inherently opposed to Poles and the Polish question.  When he became Chancellor in 
1871, he would often times take a hard line towards the Polish question. Bismarck 
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believed that Poles “would remain our sworn enemies as long as they had not been 
conquered.”97
  Attacks on the Polish populations of Prussia began with the appointment of 
Archbishop Ledochowski, who was a Prussian sympathizer and an anti-Polish nationalist. 
Ledochowski promoted the German cause, which led to tensions between the Church and 
the minority Poles.
 It is now no surprise that once Bismarck took power within Prussia and, 
eventually, Germany that he would pursue anti-Polish policies. Bismarck and Germany’s 
nationalism would strongly resemble the ethno-linguistic style of nationalism described 
by Brubaker. 
98 Bismarck’s first and real attack on the Polish population came with 
the enactment of the Kulturkampf in 1871. The original premise of the Kulturkampf was 
to combat the Catholic minority presence within the Prussian Empire, but it was also used 
by Bismarck to put pressure on the Polish minority, which happened to be largely 
Catholic.99 In addition to sponsoring the Kulturkampf, Bismarck also put in place other 
anti-Polish policies such as the School Supervision Law, which put all schools, private or 
public, under the supervision of the state. This had an impact upon the Polish population 
because it kept Polish priests out of the educational system and also kept the Polish 
language out of schools.100 In 1876 Polish was banned from being used in public offices 
and in 1877 it was excluded from use within Courts.101
 Bismarck brought the Kulturkampf to an end in the 1880s, yet his campaign 
against the Polish population continued. Blanke suggests that Bismarck “would have 
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ended the Kulturkampf much sooner had he been able to have one policy towards the 
Church in German areas and another in the Polish provinces.”102 In 1885, Bismarck 
ordered the expulsion of some 30,000 Russians. These “Russians” were resident aliens, 
yet a large chunk of these Russians were actually Poles who had come across the border 
to work as farm hands. These expulsions continued into 1887. By the time the expulsions 
finally ended, more than 29,000 people had been removed from the Polish provinces.103 
In 1886 Bismarck enacted the Settlement Law, which granted public funds to help 
German citizens buy land within the Polish provinces.104 These anti-Polish policies 
tapered off with the decline of Bismarck but only for a short period of time. By 1894, 
with the conclusion of the German-Russian tariff war, anti-Polish policies would begin 
again with renewed vehemence. By 1899 a “policy of extermination” was beginning to 
form with the goal of  removing the cultural and economic presence of the Polish 
population. These anti-Polish policies would continue right up till the outbreak of World 
War I.105
 It is important to note that even with all of these policies, the Prussian and 
German governments were never able to completely stamp out the Polish presence within 
its borders, especially when one looks at the composition of the region as seen in Section 
Two. For instance within the cities of Pozan (Poznań), Bromberg (Bydgoszcz), 
Marienwerder (Bydgoszcz),, and Oppeln (Opole) the Polish population increased at a 
greater rate then the German population. And in the case of Pozan and Bromberg, the 
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percent of the province that was German decreased.106 It is also equally important to note 
that the policies did work in some areas, such as is the case in Masuria.107 Finally, 
however, the Prussian and German governments were able to keep the Polish national 
movement in check. Of all the partitioned areas, the Prussian area shows the least amount 
of an outward national movement. This could be due to the highly involved Prussian 
government or the lack of real political power, as evidenced by the fact that the Polish 
provinces did not receive the right to be represented in the Reichstag in 1872 like most of 
the other provinces.108
 The policies enacted by the Prussian-German government had the effect of 
solidifying the Polish nationality within the region and helping to keep the Polish culture 
alive within the partitioned areas, while at the same time keeping the active national 
movements in check. This would be important because it would become one of the 
foundations for Roman Dmowski’s political ideology. Political oppression and strict 
controls along with the nationalist policy of the Germans forced or convinced political 
elites of the Poles to leave Germany for safer and greener pastures, which left the 
nationalist movements with few leaders and left the movement underdeveloped. Germany 
was not a kind place for Poles, especially Poles with nationalist dreams. The economic 
position of the Poles within Prussian-Poland also played a role. Most Poles were peasants, 
farmers, or alien residents brought over to help with farming. While a middle class 
existed, it was very limited, due mainly to the anti-Polish policies and pro-German 
policies enacted. The most important aspect of the Prusso-German example is that even 
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with anti-Polish and pro-German national policies, Polish culture and language was able 
to survive and in some sense thrive. While a singular nationalist program did not develop, 
the people within the Prussian-Polish lands would be ripe and willing participants when 
the time came to join a national cause. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
37 
Section Four: Political Ideologies and Political Figures 
 
 Polish political thought leading up to the 1863 uprising, is often described as 
Romantic, however, this title does not do the views of the Poles full justice.  Polish-
Romanticism sprung from Insurrection of 1830-1831 and the 1791 Constitution of May 
3rd. Its primary focus was that of glorying the achievements of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth and bringing about the renewal of this great Kingdom through any means 
necessary, but primarily through armed struggle.109 One of the main emphases of Polish 
Romanticism was that it, as Andrzej Walicki puts it, “… stubbornly hoped that the 
Ukrainian and Belarusian peasants would join the Polish revolutionary movement and 
freely define themselves as ‘Political Poles.’”110
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 Due to this tie to a multiethnic nature 
and the fact that Polish society did not match that of the West, which was focused on 
industrialization and, at the time, constitutional monarchism, Polish Romanticism had a 
very anti-Western feel to it. The most important point to take away from the Polish 
Romantic era, in regards to this thesis, is its dependence and desire for revolutionary 
action. The Romantic Poles believed that they were not only fighting for a free and 
independent Poland but for a better world. They believed that it was Poland’s destiny to 
take down the old order of the world and bring about enlightenment. It was because of 
this view that “the Polish national cause was made inseparable from the commitment to a 
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revolutionary destruction of the corrupt ‘old world.’”111 This desire for revolution would 
eventually spark the 1863 January Uprising.112
 1864 marks an important turning point in the context of political thought amongst 
Poles in Russian Poland. By 1864, the January Uprising had been crushed and, as 
explained earlier, Imperial Russia was not pleased with the Polish lands. Imperial Russia, 
formally and informally, went about punishing the Poles for their actions and was 
determined to set a tone that would prevent future uprisings and conflicts. It was 
specifically this atmosphere and the failure of the revolution itself that eventually gave 
birth to a new political ideology. This new ideology would come in the form of a unique 
style of Positivism known as Polish Positivism. According to Porter, Polish Positivism:  
 
was more than laissez-faire economics, “bourgeois” values, social modernization, 
and anticlericalism…The Warsaw liberals removed the nation from the political 
mode of discourse within which it had been embedded for decades and transposed 
it to a social framework.113
 
 
Romantic ideals and failed revolutions had left the Poles with a backward state and still 
no freedom. The Polish Positivists would put independence on the back burner in favor of 
a socially active and modernizing policy. 
 Following Porter’s argument, Polish Positivism was strongly influenced by the 
works of John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer and Thomas Buckle. This is an interesting 
deviation from the traditional, and arguably the most famous Positivist, Auguste Comte. 
“The Poles found in these authors a combination of liberalism and science that served 
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them well.”114 They used these figures to build a new ideology, one that was lest mired in 
the past and more focused on Western values. Following Walicki, Polish Positivism was 
also set on modernizing the ancient Congress Kingdom: while they had a deep suspicion 
towards capitalist and mass industrialization, due to domination by Germans and Jews 
within the area, Polish Positivists were largely in favor of industrializing Russian 
Poland.115 The movement also moved away from the multiethnic view of romanticism 
and instead began to define the Polish nation as an ethno-linguistic community. This 
trend would be important, as it would begin to serve as the foundation of further political 
movements, most notably that of Roman Dmowski and his National Democrats.116
 One of the main tenets of Polish Positivism is the concept of “organic work,” the 
idea of abandoning the lofty dreams and ambitions of the Romantic period and replacing 
it with an ethic of work. As Aleksander Świętochowski, a prominent Polish intelligentsia 
and Positivist, would put it, Poles needed to 
 
not expect anything from political revolutions, wars, treaties, the shifting favors of 
foreigners, but let us trust only our own vitality. Let us occupy all vacant positions, 
let us penetrate all gaps, let us strike roots wherever we find propitious soil.117
 
 
Positivist work revolved around participating within the framework of all open avenues. 
This included working with the Russian government, a sentiment that had not previously 
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been very popular.118 The end goal of Polish Positivist thought and the ideal of organic 
work was not independence, but improving the condition of the people. Polish Positivist 
thought had to move away from independence, but it is important to note that it did not 
move on from the dream, it merely put this aside in order to focus on more tangible and, 
according to its beliefs, more productive ventures.119
 By the 1890s things would begin to change again within the world of Polish 
political thought. Polish Positivism and its policies had been in place for over 20 years, 
yet the status quo and conditions within the Congress Kingdom had remained mostly the 
same. Even with the active participation of the Polish intelligentsia, the Russian 
government had done very little in way of reform within the Kingdom. This lack of 
progress, or at the very least the perception that progress had not been made, coupled 
with the growth and maturation of a generation of Poles who had not suffered through the 
consequences of 1863 Uprising, opened the door for the emergence of new political 
thought.
  
120
 Polish nationalism by the turn of the 19
 This new political thought would be that of nationalism, however, it would 
not take on a singular form, or an almost singular form, the way that Positivism or even 
Romanticism had. 
th
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 century emerged in two prominent forms. 
The first was the ideology of the National Democrats or Endeks, dominated by Roman 
Dmowski. The second major force to emerge was that of the socialists, characterized 
further by two distinct groups: the socialist school of thinking tied to Rosa Luxemburg 
and The Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland (SDKP), and the Polish Socialist 
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Party (PPS). The SDKP operated primarily outside of Poland and its goal was not of 
Polish nationalism, but for a traditional class revolution. The PPS is, more important 
within the framework of this thesis. In 1906 the PPS split into the PPS-Left and PPS- 
Revolutionary Faction. This study will focus on the PPS- Revolutionary Faction and, 
primarily, its leader Józef Piłsudski.121
 Prior to the development of these two parties, it is worth noting the importance of 
the Krakow Conservatives, who formed the intellectual backdrop of Austro-Hungarian 
Galicia in the late nineteenth century. The Krakow Conservatives can best be described 
as a school of thought or a loose association of like-minded individuals who were the 
physical embodiment of the Polish Positivist movement. While mainly active in the 
1870s and 1880s, they continued to function into the 1890s and beyond, but in a limited 
capacity. In line with Polish Positivist thought, discussed earlier in this Section, the 
Krakow Conservatives promoted “organic work” and later would be proponents of 
“triloyalism.”
  
122 They were also very skeptical of the May Constitution and the “gentry 
democracy” it had tried to set up, and in line with Polish Positivism, were pro-Western 
and adamantly against Slavophilism.123
 Those affiliated with the Krakow Conservatives can largely be categorized into 
three groups: landowners, intellectuals, or both. Some of the more prominent people 
affiliated with the Krakow Conservatives were Jożef Szujski, Walerjan Kalinka, and 
Michał Bobrzyński. All three of these were university men who had great influence in the 
politics of Austrian partition; both Szujski and Bobrzyński were known for their 
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historical works on Poland.124
 
 It would be from this political tradition that the two 
following political parties would emerge yet it would also be against the political 
ideologies of the Krakow Conservatives and Polish Positivism that the two forms of 
nationalism would develop. 
Dmowski and the Endekcja 
 Roman Dmowski was born August 9, 1864 in the Warsaw suburb Praga and was 
born into the petty gentry or szlachta. Dmowski grew up in Russian Poland and attended 
the Jagiellonian University in 1877. Throughout his university years, Dmowski showed 
distaste for the Russian educational system and the Russification process; however, he 
would not enter the political arena at this time.125 In 1886, Dmowski enrolled at the 
Russian University in Warsaw and pursued studies in biology and other natural sciences. 
It was during this period that Dmowski would start becoming involved with political 
matters, but only in a limited sense.126
                                                        
124 Fountain, 3. 
 In 1889 Dmowski joined the Liga Polska, marking 
the moment when Dmowski’s life focus would shift away from education towards active 
political participation. With this shift towards political life, Dmowski needed a new arena 
in which to operate. The conditions in Russia did not promote political thought and 
discussion, thus Dmowski set off for the Austrian Partition, a place in which he would be 
afforded great political freedom. The Liga Polska, founded in 1887, would eventually 
125 Fountain, 1, 8-11. 
126 Fountain, 12. 
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become the National Democrats and, in the process of this transformation, Dmowski’s 
party.127
 Dmowski’s political ideologies consisted of two main tenets. The first of these 
was the forging of a new political and nationally conscious Pole.  Dmowski looked at the 
national policies of the British and Germans with awe. He respected and admired the 
strong and nationally conscious middle classes of the two nations. Dmowski looked at 
Poland’s past and critically judged the Poles and their character. According to Alvin 
Fountain:  
  
Dmowski believed that the Poles were passive, waiting for the action to come to 
  them… they were now generally thought of as belonging to the ‘softest and  
 meekest of nations in Europe, much inclined to a carefree life.’ They were known 
  as a ‘feminine’ people.128
 
 
 Dmowski wanted to change this character and decided to do so through his policy of 
“integral nationalism.” Integral nationalism was a severe critique of the national past and 
a program of radical modernization of the national character. Dmowski would not settle 
for half-Poles, or simple patriotic attitudes. He believed that in order for a truly free and 
independent Polish state to not only re-emerge but also survive, a new Polish national 
character must be built, and this was only going to occur with unwavering 
commitment.129 This policy was not class sensitive; his only desire was for a committed 
Pole. Dmowski did not want to strengthen the nobility, for he believed that they were at 
the root of Poland’s current situation, nor did he wish to elevate any one class above 
another.130
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 Also present within this policy was Dmowski’s stance on the Jewish element 
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within the Polish lands. Dmowski felt that the Jews would not be open to the idea of 
assimilation and that an assimilation of a large number of Jews would undesirable, for 
Dmowski believed they lacked the necessary character qualities he was looking for.131 It 
is important to point out that while Dmowski’s ideology was infused with anti-Semitism, 
he was not a proponent of a radical elimination of the Jews. His anti-Semitism arose from 
the fact that he viewed the Jewish element as foreign and believed them to be a roadblock 
in the development of Polish nationalism.132
“Why is there such a dislike of Jews in Poland? The Jews are the salt of the earth. 
It is necessary to court them.” At that Dmowski cut in: “I will not go into whether 
they are salt of the earth or not. Salt is a good condiment and if added to a soup in 
measured amount it brings out the taste. But if too much is poured in, no one can 
finish the soup.”
 At a gathering in Edinburgh he was asked: 
133
 
 
A related factor in the development and forging of the new Pole was Dmowski’s 
admiration of the German Poles. Dmowski claimed that “[The Prussians] have instead 
rendered us a service of historic importance, namely they have created in their area the 
circumstances which speeded our transformation into an active society.”134 He admired 
the German Poles for fighting back against the nationalist advances of the Germans, and 
firmly believed that the German Poles should serve as the model for the new nationalist 
Pole.135
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 The second tenet was that the Germans were the biggest threat to the survival of 
Polish nationalism. In a lecture given at Cambridge University in 1916,136
All three parts of Poland had their own political struggle, but a close analysis of 
 the political situation of the whole of Poland revealed to the Polish leaders the 
 following facts: first, that the greatest danger threatening the national existence of 
 the Poles came from Germany; for the German view was that… they must destroy 
 not only the Poles in German Poland but must look to the future destruction of the 
 kingdom of Warsaw.
 Roman 
Dmowski stated that 
137
 
 
Dmowski believed the Germans would go and had gone to great lengths to destroy Polish 
nationalism. Dmowski feared and admired German nationalist policy because he 
understood it well, due to the fact that he had modeled his own nationalist policy off of it. 
He understood that the German nationalism must destroy all other threats to its hegemony 
in order become dominant.138
While Dmowski feared German intentions, he was firmly of the belief that the 
Russian and Austrian empires were of no real threat to the Polish nationalism. Of the 
Austrian Partition, Dmowski thought that the Poles “lived throughout the last fifty years 
in conditions most favorable to the progress of national culture,” while Russian 
nationalist policies did not truly threaten the Poles.
  
139 Dmowski was also in the camp that 
insisted that Russia would play a major role in the survival of Poland, especially against 
the advances of German interest.140
                                                        
136 It is worth pointing out that this lecture was given during the heaviest fighting of 
World War I, thus it could have, at least partly, influenced the opinion given. 
 One final important aspect of Dmowski’s policy is its 
anti-militant nature: Dmowski was firmly against the use of violent means, at least under 
137 Roman Dmowski, “Poland, Old and New” in Russian Realities & Problems, ed. J.D. 
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the contemporary circumstances. He believed that the use of violence would only serve 
the Imperial powers because it would give them an arena in which they could simply use 
their superior strength to crush the nationalist movement. Dmowski concluded that 
building a nationalist movement through forging of a new character would be a much 
harder thing for the imperial governments to combat, let alone destroy.141
 
 
Piłsudski and Polish Socialism 
The other prominent political ideology at the time was that of Piłsudski-style 
Socialism. As mentioned earlier, two basic camps emerged in the late 1880s and early 
1890s, the socialist party of Rosa Luxembourg and the more national Polish Socialist 
Party. For the purposes of this thesis we will examine the PPS and more specifically the 
role and writings of Józef Piłsudski. Piłsudski was born December 5th, 1867 north of 
Wilno, also into a szchalata family. Like Dmowski, Piłsudski’s upbringing was relatively 
privileged and Piłsudski was afforded the opportunity to seek higher education. 
Significantly, Piłsudski’s mother was, in his words an “irreconcilable patriot” and that 
she “did not even try to hide from us the pain and disappointment that the failure of the 
rising caused her.”142 During Piłsudski’s education he would learn to dislike the Russian 
elements within Poland and in general. He would learn to hate that lack of Polish history 
and culture within the classroom and, above all else, the way the Russians gave him “the 
feeling of being a slave who can be crushed like a worm at any moment.”143
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upbringing might explain why Piłsudski’s brand of socialism carried with it such strong 
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nationalist feelings. Piłsudski began his ascent into socialist thought during his university 
years, but it was during his exile in Serbia for the attempted assassination of the Tsar 
Alexander III that he truly committed himself to the socialist cause. When his exile ended, 
Piłsudski set out for Galicia, where he believed he would be able to make the biggest 
impact.144
 As mentioned, Piłsudski’s brand of socialism differed from the standard type 
popular at that time; Piłsudski was not merely trying to ignite the revolution of the 
proletariat but was attempting to use the unification and revolution of the working class 
to create an independent Poland.
 As described earlier, Galicia provided the perfect environment for political 
activity for Poles due to the relatively open environment and favorable conditions for 
political expression. 
145 Piłsudski believed that “The socialist in Poland must 
aim at the independence of his country, and the independence is the obvious condition for 
victory of socialism in Poland.”146 Another component of Piłsudski’s socialist platform 
was its very anti-Russian stance, whereby the Russian empire and by proxy the Russian 
people were the enemies of the Poles. He did not think that there was any way an 
independent Poland and independent Russian state could co-exist.147 Instead, Piłsudski 
looked towards the Germans, but more specifically the socialist elements within the 
Germany and its Riechstag. He believed that the more liberal Germany would be a 
greater ally to the Poles and the Poles plight for independence and socialist agenda.148
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 One last important aspect of Piłsudski’s ideology and the ideology of the PPS is 
their desire and support for armed insurrection and revolution. Piłsudski and the Party 
were fully in favor of igniting and supporting a revolution that they believed would help 
bring about the independence of Poland and their socialist platform.149
turning (of) every party and, above all the socialist, into an organ of physical 
force; an organ, to describe it in terms odious to our ‘Humanitarians’ (hysterical 
girls who can’t bear to hear glass scraped but let you spit in their faces) of 
superior brute strength.
 In Piłsudski’s 
words, the goal was to be the 
150
 
 
This fomenting of revolution is very noticeable during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-
1905. Shortly after the war broke out, Piłsudski traveled to Japan in an attempt to offer 
aid to the Japanese in exchange for political considerations for Poland. Events transpired 
that kept the Japanese from supporting the PPS, but not for lack of effort by Piłsudski.151 
The PPS also played a prominent role within the 1905 revolution, though it did not bear 
the result they had hoped for.152
 The impact of the imperial powers within each partitioned area is most notable 
when looking at the development of political ideologies that lead to different forms of 
nationalism. Each partitioned area was able to provide a significant piece that helped 
shape one of the nationalist ideologies described above. The ultra-nationalist policies of 
Germany, discussed earlier, provided the perfect environment for the forging and 
strengthening of a Polish national identity that was resistant to the nationalist efforts of 
the Germans. This new identity was focused on survival and determined to persevere. 
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When pushed up against the wall, the Polish minority responded, creating what would 
eventually serve as a model for Dmowski-style Polish nationalism, one based on ethnicity 
and hegemony. The Russian partition, where the bulk of the Polish population could be 
found, was relatively backward politically and economically; the Russian government did 
enough, while not doing too much, to create a situation in which no rival Polish 
nationalist movements were able to develop. Specifically the lack of political expression 
and political repression forced or prompted most political elites, like Dmowski and 
Piłsudski, out of Russia and into Galicia, where conditions were much more favorable.  
The hands off nature of the Hapsburg Empire created the perfect situation in which 
political exiles from both the Prussian and Russian partition could congregate and 
develop singular and unified political platforms. 
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Conclusion 
 By the beginning of World War I, the partitioned areas of Poland still remained 
separated and, prior to the outbreak of the war, had very little hope of achieving the 
dream of independence. Yet, even though the tangible result of independence may have 
seemed far off, the Polish people, mainly the upper and middle classes, had begun laying 
the foundation of future national movements. The period between 1863 and 1914 was a 
critical point in the development of the national philosophies and identities that would 
eventually emerge in force during the inter-war period. Each partitioned area was able to 
provide a vital piece in what would eventually emerge. In my final estimation, it was 
almost a benefit to the development of Polish nationalism that Poland was partitioned 
into three separate empires. While each empire provided a vastly different experience for 
each Pole, yet, the Polish middle and upper classes were able to capitalize upon all of 
these experiences and develop a comprehensive sense of national identity. Each region 
contributed to this in some way, whether it was the building of and ethnically-defined 
national character in the German partition, the preservation of Polish culture and identity 
within the Russian partition, or--possibly the most important factor in terms of forging a 
national identity--the politically free atmosphere of Galicia which provided the Polish 
elites with a political forum to express and propagate its newly formed ideals.  
 In Section Three I looked at the policies of each partitioned area, focusing on the 
attitudes of the imperial governments and how they affected the policies they put in place 
for or against the Poles, as well as the role and attitudes of local governments towards the 
Polish population. Interestingly, each imperial government took a different approach to 
its administration of its Polish lands. The only imperial policy that can be deemed a 
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success, when one considers its original intent, was that of the Hapsburg Empire, yet 
even it did not fully succeed. The policies of nationalization put in place by Bismarck and 
the German government, were clearly unable to eliminate the sense of a Polish identity 
among the Polish minority within its borders. In some regards these policies actually 
strengthened the Polish element within the German Empire.  
The Russian Empire was just as unsuccessful with its policies. While the Russian 
government never truly implemented an anti-Polish policy, its agenda was to win over the 
peasantry, weaken the elites within Poland, and make the Polish population subservient to 
the Russian rule. The Russian government failed in winning over the peasantry, who 
remained for the most part politically and nationally opposed to Russian influence. The 
Russians had more success in limiting the role of the elites, but were incapable of keeping 
them in check. This is evidenced by the two revolutions during this period, one in 1863 
and, more importantly, 1905. The Tsarist government was never able to appease the 
Polish population, even when it relaxed its policies and was willing to work with Poles 
within the framework of the empire. The lack of political and economic reform, along 
with the continued Russification policies implemented by local governors, eventually led 
to disillusionment with the Russian Empire and a return for the desire of independence.  
Finally, the Hapsburg Empire succeeded in gaining the loyalty of the local elites 
and promoting the interest of the Hapsburg Empire through its hands off nature and 
support of the old Polish nobility. Yet, in the end, even this did not work. In fact it would 
be this hands-off nature that would eventually lead to the failure. The laissez-faire style 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire created an environment that eventually fostered the 
development of nationalist political ideologies and ideals.  While the Hapsburgs were 
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able to gain the loyalty of the established elites, they were unable to keep out the eventual 
influx of a new Polish intelligentsia who would come to dominate the region. Once the 
new elites arrived, it was too late for the Hapsburg Empire to make the necessary changes 
to keep the Galician region from fracturing along with the rest of the multiethnic empire. 
In Section Four I analyzed the development of Polish Positivism, Roman 
Dmowski’s ideology and Piłsudski’s nationalist brand of socialism. The most important 
conclusions from this section is the importance of Galicia, as mentioned above, and the 
freedom it provided to the development of these ideals, specifically Dmowski’s and 
Piłsudski’s thinking, and how the experience and circumstance of this period helped lay 
the foundation for the future Polish nationalist movements. It might be useful to return to 
the theories of nationalism of Gellner, Brubaker, and Chatterjee, and consider how they 
apply to the Polish situation now that the specific circumstances have been examined. 
When looking at Gellner’s theory, the most obvious thing that comes to mind is the 
development of a singular high culture within the three partitioned areas even though 
these areas did not meet the industrial criteria prescribed by Gellner. However, Gellner’s 
concept that a single high culture needs to exist is clearly present. Without the interaction 
of all three areas and the common experiences they were able to share across borders, a 
singular Polish identity would not have been able to develop. Had each of the partitions 
been more thoroughly cut off from one another, it is highly possible that three distinct 
national movements could have developed. The ideas of Brubaker are less apparent in 
this period, but his assertions still resonate. Brubaker’s argument about the development 
of nationalism along ethno-linguistic lines is spot on when looking at the national 
ideologies of Roman Dmowski. Furthermore, Brubaker’s skepticism of the importance of 
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ancient history holds true in the Polish case: had ancient histories truly been a 
determining factor in the development of nationalism, we would expect the reemergence 
of a unified Polish and Lithuanian national identity, yet, clearly this did not happen. 
Instead Polish and Lithuanian nationalism developed along their respective ethnic and 
linguistic differences.  Finally, the parallel with Chatterjee’s work is clearly present 
within Section Four. In both cases the intelligentsia played an important role in the 
cultural and philosophical development of national identity and nationalist movements. 
Also, in both cases the intelligentsias were able to generate specific forms of nationalism 
for their local situation that had not previously been imagined. 
This thesis has introduced a new way of understanding Polish national identity by 
analyzing the partitioned areas of Poland in a comparative field. Previous studies all 
simply treated each individual partition as if it were a singular actor, and not the 
dynamics that arose between them. I believe it is important to look at how all three 
partitions affected one another, for it is clear that the ultimate effects of the imperial 
policies on national identity are interconnected. The importance of this era for the 
development of modern day Poland and modern day Polish nationalism cannot be 
understated. Future areas of scholarship could focus on the lingering distinctions of how 
Polish identity is constructed in these three regions or the eventual disappearance of these 
distinctions. Other scholarship could detail the legacy of Dmowski and Piłsudski’s 
ideologies and the impact they had on inter-war Poland and post-Soviet Poland. Finally, 
one could trace the specificity of the nationalist attitudes described above, and how they 
are still present today in Polish politics. 
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